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MARKET FAILURE
Market failure theories underlie most economic argu-
ments for government intervention in the economy.
When markets operate in accordance with standard
economic assumptions, no person can be made better
off except by making someone else worse off. The
range of government activity in such a world conse-
quently is constrained. However, when markets fail to
operate in accordance with the standard model, gov-
ernment policy may improve economic outcomes by
ameliorating the market failure.
Efficient Markets: The First and 
Second Welfare Theorems
Economists define market failure against a theoretical,
ideally operating economy. When individuals are free
to trade in a competitive marketplace where no exter-
nalities in production or consumption exist, the result-
ing distribution of resources in the economy is Pareto
efficient: no person can be made better off without
making some other person worse off. At this equilib-
rium, the price system has coordinated the activities 
of all market participants such that all resources have
moved to their most highly valued uses. Work by
Kenneth Arrow, Gerald Debreu, and Francis Bator in
the 1950s provided formal proof of the conditions
under which market equilibrium is Pareto efficient:
the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
The first welfare theorem refers only to the efficiency
of the equilibrium; it says nothing about whether the
resulting allocations are fair or just. However, many
potential allocations satisfy Pareto efficiency. The sec-
ond welfare theorem shows that any efficient equilib-
rium is achievable through the operation of competitive
markets with redistribution of individual endowments 
or wealth. Consequently, if one deems the results of a
market process inequitable, economists would argue
that any correction should be implemented via changes
in endowments rather than through interventions in the
workings of the price system. For example, if certain
individuals were unable to afford decent housing, the
second welfare theorem would suggest that the appro-
priate corrective measure, if someone desired it, is to
increase those individuals’ incomes (funded via a
nondistortionary tax) rather than to provide targeted
housing subsidies or impose price controls. Such policy
would not work to correct any market failure; rather, it
would work to select among efficient outcomes for 
reasons of equity.
When the conditions underlying the first welfare
theorem fail to hold, we can expect market failure.
Market failure consequently has a very precise mean-
ing for economists, despite its often loose usage 
elsewhere: it requires a failure of the first welfare the-
orem rather than simple dissatisfaction with market
outcomes.
When markets fail, government intervention may
improve outcomes; however, one cannot guarantee
such improvement. Economists define market failure
relative to a norm of Pareto efficiency rather than in
comparison with a potential policy intervention. For
purposes of policy analysis, identification of market
failure is not sufficient to require government inter-
vention; rather, one should base policy intervention on
sound comparative institutional analysis that balances
the imperfections of markets and politics.
Ways Markets Fail: Competition,
Externalities, and Public Goods
When markets are not competitive, market failure
may result. A monopolist has an incentive to restrict
output and raise price, creating deadweight losses.
Where monopolists can engage in price discrimina-
tion, they reduce such losses. Antitrust policy works to
mitigate losses due to lack of competition; however,
the costs of such policy need careful weighing against
potential benefits.
Externalities can also generate market failure.
When an activity generates external costs, we expect
that the market outcome will involve too much of the
externality-generating activity when compared with 
a Pareto optimum; conversely, activities generating
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external benefits will be underprovided. Externalities
that do not result in resource misallocation cause 
no market failure. The losing bidder at an auction
imposes a pecuniary externality on the winning bidder
by forcing payment of a higher price; however, the
loss to the buyer matches exactly the gain to the seller.
A public good produces external benefits and has
the particular characteristic of being both nonrival in
consumption and nonexcludable. Once the good is pro-
duced, it is impossible to prevent anyone from enjoying
its benefits, and any one person’s enjoyment of those
benefits does not diminish the like enjoyment of any
other person. Radio transmissions are a public good:
once the signal transmits, any number of receivers can
listen simultaneously without harming other users, and
one cannot exclude others within the transmission
range from listening. Because the good is nonexclud-
able, economists typically predict the good will not 
be produced at all since no one will incur the costs of
production where those costs cannot be recouped.
Moreover, because the good is nonrivalrous, the mar-
ginal cost of any additional user consuming the good is
zero; any price charged that prevents someone from
using the good would consequently be inefficient even
if one could force the payment.
Ways Markets Fail: Information
Asymmetry
Seminal work in the 1970s by Bruce Greenwald and
Joseph Stiglitz demonstrated that when relevant infor-
mation is dispersed asymmetrically across players in
the economy, markets could fail to produce efficient
outcomes. In moral hazard models, workers shirk,
insurance consumers take too many risks, and borrow-
ers default. Individuals take individually rational but
externality-generating action after having agreed to 
an employment, insurance, loan, or other contract. In
adverse selection models, information asymmetry
causes market failure before the signing of contracts.
Employers offer high salaries to induce better-quality
workers to apply for the job, raising overall wages and
inducing inefficient equilibrium unemployment. Risk
lovers purchase insurance, driving up prices and forc-
ing risk-averse individuals out of the market. High-risk
firms bid up the loan interest rate, keeping less risky
firms out of the borrowing market. Parties may work 
to mitigate moral hazard or adverse selection prob-
lems, but solutions will remain inefficient relative to
the first best, where all agents have the same infor-
mation. While examples here focus on employment,
insurance, and credit markets, Greenwald and Stiglitz
show asymmetric information to be a pervasive cause
of market failure.
Mitigating Failure
When markets fail, potential gains from trade exist 
but remain unrealized due to some imperfection in the
market. Any firm able to find even a partial solution to
the market failure can reap large profits by doing so. A
strict application of public goods theory might suggest
that radio transmissions will not develop, but firms
quickly learned that the combination of advertising
and public broadcast works well. In other cases, gov-
ernment action proves the best remedy to market 
failure. Comparative institutional analysis weighing
the losses due to both market and governmental imper-
fections should precede policy intervention seeking to
remedy market failure.
Ronald Coase demonstrated that where property
rights are well defined, parties could efficiently bar-
gain to solve externality problems. If engaging in the
externality-generating activity is efficient, the party
engaging in the activity either can have the right to do
so or can pay those adversely affected and buy from
them the right to engage in the activity. If it is ineffi-
cient, the party will not be able to afford to compensate
the offended parties if they have the right to stop the
activity, or the transgressed parties will pay the indi-
vidual to cease the activity if that individual otherwise
has the right to do it. High transaction costs may pre-
vent some such bargains. A person driving a polluting
car would have a difficult time finding all the people
who might be affected by the car’s emissions.
Government regulation or taxation of negative exter-
nalities is more likely to be the efficient solution when
the number of parties to the transaction is high or
where property rights cannot readily be assigned.
Many economists have suggested that a Pigouvian tax
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on carbon emissions may be the most efficient solution
to global warming, for instance.
Public goods problems can be solved privately if a
private tied good can be found (as in the radio exam-
ple), if any party would derive private benefits from
creating the public goods in excess of the costs of pro-
ducing the good, or if technology can be developed 
to render the good excludable. Scrambling television
signals can exclude those who do not pay a subscrip-
tion fee. The marginal cost of providing the signal to
an additional user is zero, so the subscription price is
inefficiently high relative to a theoretical ideal, but
where the alternative is that no one provides the good
at all, the efficiency losses are comparatively small.
Government can more efficiently provide other public
goods, like national defense.
Similarly, when asymmetric information prevents
buyers and sellers from interacting, one can earn prof-
its by bridging the gap between the parties and facili-
tating trade. George Akerlof’s “lemon” model of the
used-car market predicts that only poor-quality used
cars will sell when buyers cannot verify the quality of
used cars. By contrast, an extensive market in used
cars exists where reputable agents test and certify
vehicle quality. Credit reporting agencies sell lenders
information on borrower default risk.
Identifying appropriate legislative or regulatory
solutions to market failures caused by asymmetric
information is difficult. The same informational prob-
lems that cause market failure in the first place also
make it more difficult for government agents to
improve outcomes.
—Eric Crampton
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MARKETS
Historically, markets were places where numerous
sellers and buyers met to exchange goods against
payment of a quid pro quo. This implied the physical
presence in the marketplace of the parties to a sales
transaction as well as of the goods sold. Such markets
are in existence still today. Due to the development of
transportation and communication technologies, how-
ever, markets are no longer necessarily attached to
specific places. They no longer require the physical
presence of the market participants, and they are no
longer limited to exchange transactions involving
goods.
Present day markets are delocalized in nature. The
parties to an exchange transaction may contact each
other by using modern means of telecommunication
(the Internet) and the market transaction’s subject
matter is no longer limited to physical products
(goods) but may also include any kind of intangible
product (such as services) as well as factors of pro-
duction (such as capital and labor). All of these may
be moved with relative ease from one place to another,
even across national borders if necessary; and pay-
ment of the quid pro quo may be effected by means of
a worldwide banking network that offers its services.
Consequently, one may define markets today in much
more abstract terms as virtual places where there is a
meeting of supply and demand as well as a meeting of
the minds of the parties, based on offer and accep-
tance, related to the market transactions.
Even though this notion of markets is theoretically
devoid of any geographical considerations, in practice
the territorial scope of markets may still be limited. The
geographical extension of markets depends on the trans-
action costs as well as on the particular transportation
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